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Error of disclosure
Abstract
Was it that there was no law, no land, a land of no one, nothing (terra nullius)? A land, but a land without
anyone or anything (a land of nobody's, no one, a land that belonged to the nothing of this other one who
by force and contract will have been turned into the subject of this law) or, more precisely, a land with
nothing, a land of nothing, a land with a very particular nothing. This land whose non-law, ostensibly, will
have become, at once for the future and throughout its indeterminate past (but how could these be
separated for a land which was said to have lacked what an officer of the English state could not
discover?), a land whose nonsite would be erased in the name of a sovereign law that recognisedjus
nullius in the site of law's dominion, demanding in this relation that law enact itself in the very site of its
absence (where this nothing would be returned to the identity ofa law that recognised nothing but its law
of identity).
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t Was it that there was no law, no land, a land of no one, nothing (terra
nullius)? Aland, but a land without anyone or anything (a land of nobody's, no
one, a land that belonged to the nothing of this other one who by force and
contract will have been turned into the subject of this law) or, more precisely, a
land with nothing, a land of nothing, a land with a very panicular nothing. This
land whose non-law, ostensibly, will have become, at once for the future and
throughout its indeterminate past (but how could these be separated for a land
which was said to have lacked what an officer of the English state could not
discover?), a land whose nonsite would be erased in the name of a sovereign
law that recognised jus nullius in the site of law's dominion, demanding in this
relation that law enact itself in the very site of its absence (where this nothing
would be returned to the identity ofa law that recognised nothing but its law of
identity). As if the emptiness belonged to the character of law, law's law, as if
terra nullius declared law's found(er)ing origin (jus dicere), was also this
nothing and yet was the affirmation of this nothing (ne-ullus, anyone or thing,
diminutive of unus, 'not-any'; ne-, the Latin adverb of negation, but also the
Latin adverb ne, yes, truly, verily - a yes of this any or one of land or law).
Terra nullius, hence, as the impossible nonsite oflaw and its demand.
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Law that approaches the Other but fails to respond to this difference that
would not be its own. Law that does not delay its gathering (Aty£lV) into this
one site, gathering every one into the one of its site. Law would require this
abandonment 10 order to assert itself, demanding a nullity with which to
demonstrate its sovereignty - that which is still not this nothing. Law lacks
even this nothing which it might determine in the arche-moment of law, which
in common law is structured around the jurisopheme of an absent and mystical
origin that precedes written law and judge made law (the childish fiction,
according to Bentham and Austin, that common law is miraculous and made by
nobody, having existed from eternity and requiring only its declaration by
judges; an absence whose danger Blackstone identified in land and property
law itself - 'We think it enough that our title is derived by the grant of the
former proprietor, by descent from our ancestors, or by the last will and
testament of the dying owner; not caring to reflect that (accurately and strictly
speaking) there is no foundation in nature or in natural law, why a set of words
upon parchment should convey the dominion of land; why the son should have
a right to exclude his fellow-creatures from a determinate spot of ground,
because his father had done so before him; or why the occupier of a particular
field or of a jewel, when lying on his death-bed, and no longer able to maintain
possession, should be entitled to tell the rest of the world which of them
should enjoy it after him. These enquiries, it must be owned, would be useless
and even troublesome in common life' (Commentaries II. 2) -, what is
'owned' in this apology, derogation, or defence, a defence that is itself
indefensible, of course bears on the error of the disclosure of this right in jus
civile that is without foundation in nature or jus naturale.).
How will the justiciability of this decision be formulated, even as it concerns the
origin and lnstauration of law in Australia in Mabo and Wik? Here, too, the
question of found law arises, and the violence of law, not least of all as the High
Court has found itself subject to calumny by state premiers and prominent
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members of the federal government over Mabo and Wik, as if this were not to
demonstrate a crisis and aporia of law, a crisis of justice as law opened to its
responsibility to the Other who precedes it, and who is without precedent.
Law, here, would search for itself in its strangeness and through its exile. Law
abandoned to its disclosure, law whose emptiness might respond to the nullity,
to the nothing, of a land, and even to a nothing which, however, it was
powerless not to submit to. (But the appeal to the null of law, even as it
distinguishes itself from natural law, a distinction not based on a difference at
all, is still an appeal to an origin and the error of its disclosure, an error
pertaining to the problem of disclosedness and origin which Heidegger,
beginning with The End ofPhilosophy and the Task afThinking and the late
Zahringen seminars from 1973, was to find deeply problematic, even as he had
approached the question of origin and appearance through aA#Jeza
(aletheia), truth, or unconcealment in On the Essence ofTruth and The Origin
ofthe Work ofArt decades earlier.)
At the limit of law, law discloses its error. It overtakes its limit without entering
anyone or any thing, without encountering what precedes it, and what was and
remains without precedent. Another encounter, then, in which law would
return from its non-encounter, would have (the conditional here is not
hypothetical) turned not into this distance, but turned away from it, returned
according to the turn of its delay (though this 'according to' does not signify
that it is in adcequatio), outdistancing the return with its delay, as if with such
a return it returned to itself and simultaneously left open an other relation. As if
its identity were here traced in this return, except that this return was always
delayed. As iflaw relayed itself.
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:j: The exilic of law and the exposed, the vulnerable, the dawn of law and this
abandonment.

:j: The site of the origin of law will not in fact have ceased to have constituted
itself except in terms of its self-identification, the mode of sovereignty of autonomy. No law will be founded, no radical suzerainty will be asserted without
resituating the site, and the subjects of this site, in relation to its nonsite namely, the real of law, the rule of legality, an act founded on a licitability that
takes place here. Which is to say that this act takes the place of a site of law, its
nonsite, whose place it takes, while simultaneously announcing and inscribing a
nothing, a null, no one, an oblivion it is powerless to forget.

:j: A law before nothing (that is not nothing) which contracted into this
distance. Nothing was left of this unnameable difference, contracting here into
a sovereign spirit, or sovereign will, a single (.UDVoa') order (apxft) ,
monarchical.
Error of disclosure. That it discloses what is. That disclosure, that this
disclosure, arrives with an errancy. An ethics of disclosure that would respond,
in its response-ability, to a movement and alteration. (How would a law
contract a nothing into its sovereign will? Error of disclosure? A question of
equity and freedom: how would law have necessitated this difference and
remained open to it, balancing itself in opposition to that nullity, identifying
itself and expanding itself with greater and greater violent force over this
relation as it weakened the question of equity and freedom by erasing the
Other whose (non)names appear differently - Mabo, Wik, Thayorre?)
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* This sovereign and monarchical law that would not go down to itself. Law
assayed and despatched on a raft of timber into the archipelago a law that
drifts without mobility, law that fails to arrive anywhere, contracting the Other
to its self. Alaw that recognised the equal in its self, as its self. (A sea that dawns
in its principial becoming-order: aPXl-n£A.ar~, a non-Greek and Italian word,
from apxfI (arche), first cause or principal, beginning, origin, but also
sovereignty, rule or power, and lu~A.ar~, sea, from neMlv, to be in motion,
to come forth, to be and to become, being-becoming, hence its affinity to
£lval, the Homeric word for being. This sea which they can not go under to,
instead enclosing everything in an identity of opposites founded in an absolute
law, a nonjusticiable origin. Here, rather, law has become totalising. Its future is
indeed a sensus communis - of this one, the Crown, the sovereign. How
would law recall this (non)origin without mourning what precedes it? We might
say, tentatively, since nothing is settled on this, that native title marks an ethical
response to the justice of law's nonjusticiabiIity, no less than to the justiceability of law.)
l

*in theThepresence
decision of law to enact itself in the absence of its absence, and hence
of that nothing, the nullity, holds forth its t-error. Law would
enact itself, would come to a decision, will have formed. Judgement (ICplVcW,
krinein) , without having, and in the fact of its not having, encountered its
ICp{(m;, krisis. Law takes place in the site of an absence that is not disclosed.
Law, we could say, and its enactment, is indicated in the taking place of
judgement, krisis, where law as decision is a taking place of judgement. Law
founds itself at the origin of krisis, and never more decisively (in certum) than
when it lacks this krisis. Sovereignty is decisive on this - it lacks nothing.
How to think, then, the aporia of law and sovereignty without thinking (this)
powerlessness, or going under to a violence of violence? But this aporia, this
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O'1(avbaAov (skdndalon, stumbling-block, offence, scandal) of law, will it not
also delay its return, and is this too not the (non)failure of krisis?
With the error of the disclosure of law, signified in terra nullius, there occurs a
taking place. Sovereign and monarchical law in this case would occupy the
nonsite of law in the authority and power of a law incapable of remaining
responsible to what is unequal to it. An ethics of responsibility here (not least
as this would recall the region of dwelling announced in the ne~) would open
to an equality without equal, an equality that did not exclude singularity and
difference. And hence an ethics open to its own exposure, that did not refuse
its krisis, overtake the Other, overrun the exilic, and the vulnerable - the very
care oflaw, which is also named justice.

t

On law and the disclosure of its sense - that law finds its own question
'unjusticiable', as Brennan, Deane and Gaudron, and Dawson JJ affirm in Mabo
(No.2). Sovereignty cannot adjudicate itself, the state cannot disclose itself, law
that cannot ask of itself whether it is right, or just, in its sovereignty,
sovereignty cannot question the reason of its reason. It is said that with respect
to the act of acquiring sovereignty over a territory the municipal couns of the
state remain incapable of questioning, or interfering with, the action of the
executive. Nothing in law is equal here to the oblivion of law. Nothing is
disclosed here, and were it to be so disclosed this disclosure would turn on an
error, an error which the law announces it is not equal to. This error would
need to be disclosed, and is a question for law. For the bench the error in the
site oflaw cannot be asked because this error is structurally necessary to the act
of law and the order of its suzerainty, hence law's incapacity, and the oblivion
of its necessity, to question the fundamental action that is simultaneously the
activity of its foundation. But this does not mean that there is no such question.
What cannot be asked, what is not justiceable and justiciable here, would be the
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nothing of law, the lex nullius (noting too the ius which is echoed here and,
even, a nonidentical law, a law of the no one and an absolutely other lawalius, (Jarepov, a foreign and strange law, and even the foreign and strange of
law - which would not be a repetition of the identical of the mysterium
tremendum of natural law, but an other law, a law that touches on (the) pain of
law) of law which law marks in its very inception, and even as its very inception,
at the dawn of law, at the moment of its appearance, an appearance which is
strictly un(re)presentable and hence too the sublime and the (t)error of law.
Law would have to (re)turn to the question of the fiction of the origin of
common law (a fiction displaced in the Napoleonic Code, which does not assert
an origin of law making identical to that of common law), judge made law, and
its relation to written law.
Where will law have originated? At the least we will need to have related the
question of the lex non scripta of Blackstone, and early English jurisprudential
thought, to the terrific distinction of ypanra (unwritten or customary law) and
the ypaq)l/(o<; vOJ1o<; (written, statute, or sovereign law) in the Antigone of
classical Greece (though the further question concerning this moment ofJaw in
Greece, whether this distinction already signifies the end of law in Greece, is
not under discussion here). How will law have distinguished itself from itself?
How will the origin of common law, at once conventional and everlasting
(apXl8iov, apxfJ-ai81O<;. beginning-eternal), have declared or written itself?
How will the leges scripta! of common law have in-scribed in the de-scription
what it has never written? And yet, when it answers that it is not justiciable this
does not mean that the answer, 'nor justiciable', is not itself justiciable or given
over to the able of justice. If this disclosure of law for law is an error, this error
itself is disclosed by law... at the moment of its foundation, at the moment of
the interruption of its limit, a moment of its dawn, this (t)error of its
unpresentability.
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Law approaches the krisis of its ethicity at the sublime of justiciability in the
question of a recognition of difference (which would be an unrecognisable
recognition) that is not subsumable to a logic of identity, a universalisable,
absolutely prescriptive and determinable reason, principle, or apxJ1. How
would law turn to the distance of the Other? But law here cannot afford to
neglect the distance of its non-justiciability without returning itself to injustice.
To respect the Other, will law not open to an equality without equal, to an
other law?

:I: The question of law and the determination of justiceability will need to
examine the philosophic character of the beginning, apXJ1, the everlasting,
apXlo{oV, and the dawn of law, logos (A6yoq), and its relation to presence
and the phenomenality oflaw as law. Law utters or enacts itself at the moment
of its unutterability. There, at the everlasting,
apxfJ, where law would
separate from its impossibility, at the interruption of impossibility, law would
name a separation without partition. What else might be indicated with this
beginning? Would an-arche come to name a non-rule, a lack and failure of rule,
or a non-beginning? The law of law will have announced, already, the lack of its
disclosure. Law, A.Oy0; here, a logos alien to a Greek formulation (where word
or ratio as essence is immanent to the cosmological, even as it moves from the
logoi to the mythoi through historico-political discourse) does not fail to
produce the absence of its rule. This, too, will have been marked in the krisis or
judgement oflaw, the necessity oflaw, a name whose truth will be justice.

ev

Alaw, too, that did not have an origin or a beginning. Law that writes in the
oblivion of this event, law as a possibility of memory, law disclosed in the act of
oblivion or amnesty. Law, and what is common to it, would have written its
origin in the error of its disclosure, an errancy in which, perhaps (how could
this be known?), the non-origin of its unconcealedness is not nothing, an other
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whose (non)site takes place in the interruption of an absolute nothing. And
hence, perhaps, to point to non-identical differences, even in the economy of
an absolute logos, and not to a finitude which ends in unity, a finitude that is
resolutely mine to the end, as this very end which determines what is singularly
my own, but an end that is not complete, a finitude without end - this end is
in krisis.

+ Law abandoned to its non-original difference. Recalling Aristotle in the fifth
book of the Nicomachean Ethics here, law lacks its determinable and universal
rule, and instead regulates its principles and procedures like the malleable form
of a lead ruler. The law (of universal reason) lacks nothing except this lack. (An
error that would need to be traced in the transformation of mythos to logos
with Plato, and hence a (t)error of reason.)

+ Writing, Law, appears before itself, before it is ready, before it is announced,
or read, or written. But before the word, what is there? Space? Time? To be
before the word would be to stand before it, before the nudity of its disclosure,
in another space, at the site of law but in its nonsite. Here, then, one might
stand before the law in this abandonment of its site. How to think the before of
the time of law? But to be before time would be, would have been, to be dead.
One cannot arrive before the law without failing to arrive. One cannot arrive
before law where, too, the death of law's time is traced in the taking place
before law.
Law lacks the poverty of its abandonment. Before it, its apriority had to pass
into the indirection of its site. (I do not know if law lasts in this nonsite, or if
law is not before the law in the necessity and responsibility of the
nonjusticiable. Law, here, would not confront itself, but what precedes it.)
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:j: Absence of the absence of law. (1)error of law.
:j: Incapable of naming itself, did law not invent names for writing itself?
:j: Law does not understand its question.
:j: Law returns without precedent (both for the state without sovereignty or
without beginning, an-arche). It writes in the non-endurance of this
impossibility. Law that does not write what was written, but what was
impossible to write, whose failure is its necessity. (Law that does not write the
real, but the actuality of pOSSibility in its reality?)

:j: Antigone and the aJl~xavov (amecbanon, distress, helpless, unworkable,
inexplicable, trouble, but also the exilic and the singular) of law. Recall here the
'ode of man' and the terrible, the 8elv6~, of law, in the Antigone, even as
Heidegger associated the terrible and the most uncanny with Antigone. But
what is terrible, too, for Heidegger, is the oblivion of difference and exposure
of a calculative technicity in which world, and the production of the world, is
made manifest and posed without ex-posure; that is, the question of what
emerges in presence without attending to its emergencee)y.

:j: The word did not know its origin. As if law were to be given in the
subjunctive. And yet, the distance indicated in this mood would call here to the
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optative - to a distance which law calls out to and stands before. But law would
return with its violence to affirm the stated, to affirm the state and its
statement. Law would assert here the thetic order of nomos, it would sign itself,
in the mediation of form (language) and that which was formed (law). (But
would the transport, communication, or translation indicate a difference
between the one and the Other, or a difference apart from them that mediated
between them? (1)error of law.)

~ Law dies at the moment of its inception, at the moment common law
recognises as both necessary and fictive. As if law shared in the origin and
difference between Myoq and jJv80q (my thos), this difference of logos as
reason or principle that Aristocles (Plato) had transformed from the earlier,
Homeric, sense of fable, and the pre-Platonic mythos that was narrative. As if
truth did not first appear here with the transformation of logos, when
logos/reason became a myth. (When there developed a nostalgia for logos,
which we can not simply distinguish in the formula logos:n:reason, and where
reason appears as a nostalgia. On the dawn of logos, then, where reason dawns
on itself, without foundation (wasn't this to be its truth too?), traced in its
translation and its transportation. Do we not locate here a certain nostalgia and
homesickness for reason in the dawn of its appearance, and even in the dawn
of this appearance? As if the longing for this return, and this return - of the
gaze of reason and to the gaze of reason - might disclose a delayed origin, and
perhaps a postponed origin, or an absent origin. And yet, we would be led to
inquire here, too, whether this was not also an irreducible moment.) As if
Aristocles, this poet and singer, this young pyrologue who burnt his works in
public in advance of abandoning poetry, could not have disclosed the sense of
reason without the error of its writing. As if reason or law did not first app~r
here, or appear here first, after the act of oblivion in the wake of whose event
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Socrates is sentenced to death, and which came to mark, in the Apology, the
first text of philosophy and a record of a criminal trial by jury, where law and
philosophy would seek an origin around crime and oblivion.
Error of disclosure - what does Socrates disclose? The political state of law, the
forgetting of which leads law into its crime. Ada:mon, a singular one, which
recommends itself only in its refusal, indicating what ought not to be done, and
which is always a trial, astumbling-block, a scandal (skdndalon), and a krisis. As
if error here were not Socrates' constitutional order of disclosure, this nudity of
thought, this one who is strange and out of place, atopos, we are almost
incapable of reading.
One abandons oneself little by little to the Apology, to the defence, the discourse, detour, speaking from withdrawal and from (ano) logos, and to this
krisis of law. (T)error of law, too, and the deinon or terrible from the
Antigone's ode to man. How would law have received its difference without
going under to its law? Awar, and wa(b)rheit, between family and state, nature
and contingency, woman and man, unwritten and written, subterranean and
heavenly, where Antigone stands over and against law in order to affirm the
law. Unprecedented, Antigone is amechanon, she does not do the work of law
but stumbles against the throne (skandalon) of Olympian law, she does not
abide by the law that would force her to leave her brother's corpse uncovered
at the limit of the city, the very border of the com-munus (fortification, wall, but
also a favour, duty, sacrifice, or gift), Disclosure and disclosure - Antigone
conceals the body, and through the disclosure makes manifest its error.
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Distance in exile. (Beloved, your approach is ununderstandable.)

t Law and writing. Law returns from its distance without memory. Law would
guide us to its writing and to the demand for 'very clear language' and 'clear
and plain intention', as was demanded by Kirby and Toohey JJ in Wik when
considering the statutory language of pastoral leases that would have
necessitated the extinguishment of the rights and interests of indigenous
people in respect of the land granted to lessees under the statute, a demand
whose express words and necessary implication was found to be wanting.
Law, here, would attend to a more original disclosure, one that supervenes its
writing, and which is guided by the twin demands of clarity and distinctness.
There is a kind of luminosity to law here that would mark the error of the
disclosure of writing, and where law would open to a supernal exigency, and
even a gr<eCo-theological appeal to the first word, and even to the first of the
word. Language, and with it a certain logos, would write here in the wake of an
origin in absence. Law writes the error of writing, in the taking place of writing,
in the possibility of the error ofoblivion.

t

Law follows the word. But does the word precede it or does it follow in the
trail of the word?

Law would open to the distance of writing. Perhaps this is a name for justice.

:j: The first name of law returned with its absence.
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:j: Law excludes its demand. The plenum dominium of law required this
nothing which it could fulfil (at the cost of the doctrine of 'nonjusticiability' for
the determination of law's sovereignty (Brennan, Deane and Gaudron, Dawson
JJ)). Heterogeneous, law would open to a finitude without end - not that it
would not, here, have purpose or an end, but that this purpose would not be
absolute or teleological, and hence an end that remains incomplete. This end
would not master itself - it is without authority, tracing the exilic order of law
in its ex-positions (nothing here indicates an essence or interiority).
Exposed, law takes place in the community without interiority. The good and
the right would be two of the nonnames of the community - this finitude
without end, a separation without partition whose event, in its taking place,
that would echo the irreducible justice in Anaximander where justice and
injustice give reparation to one another in their taking place.
(The community exposes its impossibility in the law.)

:j: Law would even mark a certain death, a trauma, an extinguishment even of
law. Law would mark a violence that would pass into its death, and pass into
another death. But of a certain kind. This death preserves the fate of violence,
which is its future.
Law stops, it must stop, it must put up a closure. Where would it be if it did not
end, if it had no end? Law collapses at its beginning.

:j: Law takes the place of writing. In the detour of this absence, convocation of
law and writing. (Law in advance of this detour, law at the limit of this advance,
as that which precedes the detour. As if law, too, did not pass before an
unsubstitutable detour. Beyond the law there is no law.)
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:j: Writing that looks like law. What they share they die and pass into, from the
licit to the legible, and back to the act of oblivion. Incapable of forgetting their
distance, this impossibility dies to itself, leaving to writing and law their singular
death, and their limit, in the text.
(A difference erased in the text, whose absence, which would also be an
unrecognisable recognition, is returned to in every reading. Reading the text,
then, as an act of oblivion. Everything here is drawn out of forgetting and
traced in its impossibility. But reading, interpreting the legible, will this not be
to open up to the distance(s) of writing (as if the word were not this word but
simultaneously spread through all its effects)? One returns to the text in order
to return to its return an order which, however, is not strictly a command, and
might be indicated in the optative, rather than the subjunctive mood. A
command without authority.)

:j: Reading is at the limit of disappearing. (Continuous error of disclosure.)
Writing interrupts reading in order to lead it into its future. The text is neither
written or unwritten, read nor not read - this is already (the) text. The book,
its passages, pass by, page after page. We do not read the whole. The book is
not read. Unless it were simply one word, and even then the word would not
be read all at once.
Exposed to its vulnerability (isn't this the book, exposure, its vulnerability, this
nudity at every page, singular vulnerability?) it also protects us. Law, then, and
the protection of the word (exposed and vulnerable).
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:j: Beloved, even the strange seems strange in you.
4: The fault of law - recalling Anaximander and the necessity and fault of law,
the necessity of law and its relation to a crisis of justice, a crisis where justice
arrives in the fault of what takes place, a crisis in this presence of disclosure of
law and justice. Presence, prcesens,prcesum, the immediate and the
momentary simultaneously (where presence is simultaneously both, and which
would also mark the indeterminate rule of presence), a presence even of the
immediate and the momentary that precedes its experience, and hence an
experience out of the future (jutura), out of what flees and abandons (jugio) ,
and a presence which also signifies to be before (prcesum) or to command
another. The future flees, the future opens onto the present and gives to the
present its presencing (q>8z, q>VelV, to produce, bring forth, come into being)
in this abandonment. To be abandoned here, then, to this future that has no
future, the real of the future, pre-sense, a non-present future that is present
and future.
How would what is disclosed (law, justice, English common law, native title, the
law of law) arrive? It will not arrive. This one is incapable of arriving - it arrives
at arriving (which is not to say that there is no native title, even as Australian
parliaments have sought to restrict it, or extinguish it, or delimit it to such an
extent that it is technically extinguished, even against the advice of the
Australian Law Reform Commission - in fact what the governments have failed
to do is to arrive at law).
Here - it has departed from its arrival. And yet how would the land arrive? How
would a certain dawn arrive? How would the a priori arrive? But it does not
arrive, appearing here in the distance of its arrival, as if this distance were its
arrival, as if to arrive might not also involve turning to this distance - nothing is
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equal to this arrival that is unprecedented, and which precedes your arrival.
There is no future that will arrive. The future does not arrive. It is without end
- incapable of ending it arrives at last, at the last, as the last that lasts, and
perhaps (but how could I, whose future has no future, know this?) ends in a
certain fination. The future does not arrive, it arrives in its nonarrival. But what,
then, would a nonarrival of the future be that does not arrive (for this double
future in which it does not arrive, and yet arrives in the failure of arrival, which
does not fail)? The pra?sent here would come to name the arrival of a future. In
the present future the future, again, returns in its arrival. It comes and takes
place. Here, then, the future of the future presents. But the future does not
take place here or there, it is not legein and signifies no gathering - the future
is taking place, and is a crisis for what takes place. Is this future without a future
not ours, and hence our present? Here, for this taking place in the nonsite of
the future, this crisis and justice would also involve a response and a
responsibility to what takes place, one where justice will call on the
impossibility of those futures in which we have taken place (Mabo, Wik, and
Bringing Them Home, Report Into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Children from their Families, are such names and such
responsibilities).
How to be just before the unsubsumable Other who precedes you and your
arrival? Nothing is equal to the krisis of this arrival, which is not the same of
your arrival or your equal. A justice, then, and a krisis of the dawn, of what
appears for a disclosure that takes place, this singularity of the dawn that isn't
the dawn. An advent, too, that marks the singularity of law with the original
founding act of sovereignty (law that appears in the presence of law's absence,
the krisis ofwhich will lead to the question of justice as the problem of law). A
singularity, however, that is not absolute either in the positivity of the infinite
or the finite, but a singularity and a finitude without end, heterogeneous,
multiple, and manifold. Asingularity, here, that dawns on the dawn without
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re(vei)lation, without the mittance that gathers (A£yezv, legein), without delay,
relay, or prolay. Nothing of it is written down, layed down, gathered together.
Justice would name a krisis of the gathering together and an exposure to the
exposed of law - to its presence, to the exilic of law and the vulnerable of law,
to what dawns with law, the emergence and emergenc(e)y of justice and an
equality without equal. (Error of disclosure - to think it, but not only to think,
but to respond to an equal that precedes you, this Other who is not identical to
the same of yours, even if you were this same, and to which your equality
would not be equal. Hence, too, to return to the question of a justice whose
reparation takes place through an original injustice, one which moreover is not
identical to the right or the good, but concerning which these latter might be
two of its names.)

:j: An infinite justice then? Or an indeterminate one? Will the call for justice be
satisfied with these? Which is also to ask, are they concrete enough? And even if
they are not absolutely concrete, even if there is no theory or praxis of a
concrete justice (would that not, reading Lyotard, mark a return to terror and a
failure to remain witnesses to the unpresentable, would the determination of
justice, as this one, this totality and unicity, which might even take the name of
reason, or the communitarian good or the liberal right, would this not
constitute the terror, and even the error of justice?), might it be the case that
they are good enough or sufficient to pass as justice? But such an appeal will
have to attend to the naturalisation of forces of relation and value, forces which
now appear to be naturally good enough or sufficient and which appear to be
nonjusticiable. A justice, hence, that would respond to an equality without
equal? Ajustice that does not respond to an infinitude, or to finitude, but to the
crisis and heteronomy of the finite and justice, to a finitude without end, a
singular and heterogeneous finitude. The disclosure of the end or the
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beginning or the infinite here would already be too determinate, too positive.
Justice, then, and a decision of a finitude without end where decision would
mark the taking place of judgement and krisis, and not only this or that
determinate taking place, and would mark a taking place that takes place here,
and is without place.
But every determination already fails to remain adequate to its termination.
Determination already de-terminates, works both possessively and intensively
on the terminal and finitude, and recoils from it, draws away from it and
undergoes the privation of a termination that forces determination into its very
crisis and makes of determination a critical issue. The crisis of judgement here,
the crisis of law, this crisis of justice that calls on judgement and justice as a
krisis, as what is critical and remains critical. The error of disclosure will be to
have failed to open and respond to the crisis disclosed in the determination of
judgement (indicated in the double logic of subjective and objective genitive),
and hence towards a justice of judgement.

:j: Law went into the distance and returned without it. No one recognised
what it was returning.

